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I. INTRODUCTION
The key issue the United States Supreme Court ("Court") decided in TarrantRegional Water District v. Hermann was whether silence with respect to
state lines in the Red River Compact ("Compact"), where the Compact provides that "Signatory States shall have equal rights to the use of water in a particular subbasin," created in those states a right to cross state lines in order to
divert their full water entitlement under the Compact.' The decision stands as
an important indication of how the Court will interpret interstate compacts
regarding cross-boundary rights in the future: the Court will not interpret a
Congressionally approved compact to preempt state water laws unless the language of the compact or the subsequent conduct of the parties clearly expresses an intent by the states to surrender plenary authority over the water resources within their borders. The result will likely impact the formation of
future interstate water compacts and may bear upon past compacts silent with
regard to cross-boundary rights. The Court's decision could also impact noncompact waters because the decision left open the possibility of dormant
The author would like to thank Susan Ryan, Attorney at Ryley Carlock & Applewhite,
P.C., for her valuable time and insightful guidance on this Case Note.
1. Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305; Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v.
Herrnann, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013).
*
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Commerce Clause limitations on a state's sovereignty to legislate against crossboundary diversions of water not allocated by an interstate compact.
In the early 1950s, Oklahoma and Texas experienced severe drought.'
The United States Geological Survey recognized the drought as the worst in
the history of Texas and the most persistent drought on record for Oklahoma.'
During this time, Texas classified all but one of its 254 counties as disaster
areas.' The drought had a severe impact on Texas' water resources and created severe water supply shortages in Oklahoma.' From 1952 to 1956 all sections of Oklahoma, with the exception of a small area in the central part of the
state, suffered from prolonged precipitation deficiencies, serious drought
damage, and critical municipal water supply problems.! States in the region
found it necessary to find long-term solutions and to develop water plans in
order to satisfy increasing demands on water resources.' It was during this time
that Congress, in 1955, authorized Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas
("Signatory States") to negotiate a compact to allocate water from the Red River and its tributaries amongst themselves.! In 1978 these states signed the Red
River Compact, which Congress subsequently approved in 1980.'
Following Congress' approval of the Compact, Texas continued to suffer
from periods of intense drought that, coupled with a significant increase in
population, further strained water supplies in north-central Texas." Between
2000 and 2001, Tarrant Regional Water District ("Tarrant"), the Texas state
agency responsible for supplying water to the region, attempted unsuccessfully
to purchase water from Oklahoma and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations."
Further, in 2007 Tarrant applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board
("OWRB") for a water resource permit knowing that Oklahoma's 2002 water
statutes prohibited the sale or export of water out-of-state and, thus, effectively
prevented out-of-state applicants from diverting water from within the state."
Considering Oklahoma's water law and anticipating rejection of its permit
requests, Tarrant simultaneously filed suit against the OWRB seeking to en-

2. Brief of Arici Curiae City of Okla. City and Okla. City Water Utils. Trust in Support
of Respondents at 3, Taran4 133 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 1308803 [hereinafter
Okla. City Amici Brief); Brief of the Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n as Arnicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5-6, Tarran4 133 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 768641 [hereinafter
Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n Amicus Briefl.
3. Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 5-6; R.L. NACE & EJ.
PLUHOwsKi, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY WATER-SUPPLY, DROUGHT OF THE 1950's wrrH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE MIDCONTINENT, PAPER 1804 79 (1965).

4.
5.

Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n Amicus Brief, supranote 2, at 5-6.
Okla. City Amici Brief, supra note 2, at 3; NACE & PLUHOWSKI, supra note 3, at 82.

6.

NACE & PLUHOWSKI, supranote 3, at 82.

7. See Okla. City Amici Brief, supranote 2, at 2.
8. Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2125-26 (2013); Act of Aug.
11, 1955, ch. 784, Pub. L. No. 84-346, 69 Stat. 654.
9. Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305.
10. Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 8; Tarran; 133 S. Ct. at
2128.
11.
Taran4 133 S. Ct. at 2128.
12. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § IB, tit. 74, § 1221(A) (2002); id.

140

WA TER IA WREVIEW

Volume 17

join enforcement of Oklahoma's statutes." Tarrant claimed that the Compact
granted Signatory States a right to cross state lines in order to divert water."
Further, Tarrant claimed that Congress' approval of the Compact preempted
Oklahoma's statutes." In fact, the Compact is silent with regard, to state lines."
In response to Tarrant's suit, OWRB argued that each state had the opportunity to divert its full entitlement from within its own boundaries and that the
Compact's drafters never intended to create such cross-border rights."
Tarrant also claimed that Oklahoma's restrictive water statutes discriminated against interstate commerce and therefore violated the dormant Commerce Clause." These statutes created a blanket prohibition on the sale or
transfer of water out-of-state." In 2009, following Tarrant's constitutional challenge of Oklahoma's water statutes, Oklahoma enacted Title 82, § 105.12(A),
replacing the former statutes and authorizing out-of-state transfers subject to
certain conditions.' While the 2009 statutes opened up the possibility for outof-state transfers, Tarrant maintained that, despite the Oklahoma legislature's
best efforts, the new statutes unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate
commerce just as the blanket ban did before."
Thus, it fell to the Court to determine the intent of the parties where the
Compact was silent with regard to cross-boundary water diversions, and to
consider whether Oklahoma's water statutes were in violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Where silence in an interstate compact is ambiguous, Tarrant provides three interpretive tools "to shed light on the intent of the
[clompact's drafters" and to construe the Compact in light of those intentions.'
First, the Court considered the well-established principle that states do not
easily cede their sovereign powers.' Second, under contract principles, the
Court considered the customary practice other states have employed when
forming interstate compacts.' Lastly, the Court considered the parties' conduct
under the Compact.' Before applying these principles, though, the Court dismissed an additional interpretive tool; the presumption against pre-emption of
state law." Finally, the Court dismissed Tarrant's claim that Oklahoma's water
statutes, as amended, violated the dormant Commerce Clause."
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Tamn4 133 S. Ct. at 2128-29.
Id.at 2129.
Id.
Id.at 2130.
Id.at 2130.
Id.at 2136.
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, S IB, tit. 74, S 1221(A) (2002).
Tit. 82, §I B, tit. 74, § 1221(A); New Bill Protects Oklahoma Water Rghts, OKLA.
WATER
NEws,
no.
2,
2009,
at
4,
available
at
http://www.owrb.ok.gov/news/news2/pdf news2/WaterNews/WaterNews2009-2.pdf (describing
the 2009 statutes as a response to applications for permits from out-of-state water entities).
21. Brief for Petitioner at 16 n.8, Taan4 133 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 648740.
22. Tarran 133 S. Ct. at 2132.
23. Id.at 2132-33.
24. Id.at 2133-35.
25. Id.at 2135.
26. Id. at 2137 n.10.
27. Id at 2136-37.
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This Case Note examines the Court's analysis with particular focus on the
Court's use of the three interpretive tools used to resolve whether ambiguous
silence in the interstate compact creates a cross-boundary right to divert water,
thereby preempting state water law statutes, or if the ambiguous silence does
not creating such a right, whereby state laws governing the use of water within
state boundaries would prevail.

II. BACKGROUND
The Red River is an important geographic feature of the South Central
United States. As a result, both the Red River and its water have been the
source of numerous historical conflicts, particularly between Texas and Oklahoma." The Red River originates on the border between New Mexico and
Texas, runs through the Texas panhandle, continues along the border between Texas and Oklahoma, flows eastward into Arkansas, and then turns
south and flows into Louisiana where it empties into the Mississippi and
Atchafalaya Rivers." Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas each rely
upon the Red River and its tributaries as a source of water for municipal and
other uses.' In the absence of an agreement or a court's equitable apportionment, the course of the river allowed the upstream states, Oklahoma and Texas, to appropriate significant amounts of water to the detriment of Arkansas
and Louisiana." This was particularly problematic for Louisiana who, lacking
the reservoir capacity to store sufficient supplies of water during high flow periods and unable to secure a commitment from upstream states to release
stored water from their reservoirs, had no guarantee of water flow from the
Red River." .
In 1955, Congress authorized these states to negotiate a compact to equitably apportion the water of the Red River basin." The four states signed the
Red River Compact over 20 years later in 1978, and Congress approved it in
1980, thereby transforming the Compact into federal law." For purposes of
allocation, the Compact divides the course of the Red River and its tributaries
into five Reaches, which it then further divides into subbasins."

28. Id.at 2125.
29. Id.
30. Okla. City Arnici Brief, supra note 2, at 1; Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n Amicus
Brief, supra note 2, at 1; Brief of the States of Louisiana and Arkansas as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Tarran4 133 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 1279456 [hereinafter
Louisiana and Arkansas Amici Briefi.
31. Id
32. Id. at 2125-26.
33. Tarran, 133 S. Ct. at 2125.
34. Id
35. Id. at 2126; Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305, § 2.12.
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APPENDIX A

Map of Reach IL Brief for Re4xmndent 33a.

Figure 1.Map ofReach H
Source: Brief for Respondent Appendix A, Tarran4 133 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11889), 2013 WL 1308803.
Relevant here, Reach II is divided into five subbasins." The Compact defines
subbasins 1 through 4 as encompassing various tributaries upstream before
they join the flow of the Red River." The Compact assigns control of the water
in these subbasins to the states within which each subbasin resides." Oklahoma
receives all waters within subbasin 1; Texas receives all waters within subbasins
2 and 4; and Oklahoma and Arkansas share the waters within subbasin 3."
Subbasin 5 encompasses the main stem of the Red River and its tributaries,
excluding the parts of those tributaries included, in the other subbasins." Subbasin 5 extends from the Denison Dam, through Oklahoma, Texas and Arkansas, to the Arkansas-Louisiana state border. 1 The allocation of water in
subbasin 5 guarantees Louisiana a minimum flow of 3,000 cubic feet per sec-

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305, SS 5.01-5.05.
Tarran4 133 S. Ct. at 2126.
Id. at 2137 n.2.
Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305, §S 5.01-5.04.
Id. § 5.05.
Id.; Tarran 133 S. Ct. at 2137 app.A.
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ond." The Compact grants each Signatory State a right to twenty-five percent
of any water in excess of Louisiana's guaranteed minimum flow.' Section
5.05(b)(1) of the Compact provides:
[tihe Signatory States shall have equal rights to the use of runoff originating in
subbasmi

5 and undesignated water flowing into subbasin 5, so long as the

flow of the Red River at the Arkansas-Louisiana state boundary is 3000 cubic

feet per second or more, provided no state is entitled to more than 25 percent of the water in excess of 3,000 cubic square feet."

Tarrant claimed Section 5.05(b)(1) of the Compact created cross-boundary
rights to divert water."
Under increasing pressure to secure additional sources of water following
periods of intense drought and a significant increase in population, and in light
of its failed attempts to purchase water, Tarrant applied to the OWRB for a
water resource permit." Simultaneously, Tarrant filed suit against the OWRB
to enjoin enforcement of Oklahoma's statutes, claiming a right to cross state
lines in order to divert Texas' allocation of water."
Although the Compact is silent with regard to state lines, Tarrant claimed
section 5.05(b)(1) created in each Signatory State a right to cross state lines in
order to divert water allocated to it from Reach II, subbasin 5." OVVRB responded that section 5.05(b)(1) provided each State only a right to access its
share of excess water within its own borders." Further, OWRB noted that Oklahoma state water laws impose stricter requirements on out-of-state users before allowing those users to divert water from within Oklahoma. ' In considering such out-of-state permits, the 2009 Oklahoma statutes require OWRB to
consider several factors before granting a permit to divert water out of State."
OVRB must consider whether an out-of-state user could transport the Wvater
to alleviate water shortages within the state." OWRB must also determine
whether issuance of the permit will "impair the ability of the State of Oklahoma [from meeting] its obligations under any interstate stream compact."' Further, Oklahoma requires legislative approval of out-of-state permits and requires that water use within the state must "be developed to the maximum
extent feasible for the benefit of Oklahoma so that out-of-state downstream
users will not acquire vested rights therein to the detriment of the citizens of
[the] state."m
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Act of Dec. 22, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305, § 5.05.
Id.
Id. S 5.05(b)(1); see also OKLA STAT. it. 82, S 1431 (2013) (text of Compact).
Tanrant 133 S. CL at 2128-29.
Tex. Water Conservation Ass'n Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 8.
Taran4 133 S. Ct. at 2128-29.
Id. at 2129-30.
Id. at 2130.
Id. at 2128.
Id. at 2128-29.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.12(A)(5) (2013).
Id.S 105.12A(B)(1).
Id. §S105.12(A)(3), 105.12A(D).
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- Tarrant, however, claimed that federal law, in the form of the federally
approved Red River Compact, preempted Oklahoma's statutes." Tarrant
pointed to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which
provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ... any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary

notwithstanding."" As such, Tarrant asserted that the federally endorsed Red
River Compact preempted Oklahoma state law, including those provisions
limiting cross-border diversions."
Thus, it was necessary for the Court to interpret the Compact and determine whether silence with regard to state lines created in the Signatory States a
right to cross state borders in order to divert water from subbasin 5. Interstate
compacts are interpreted under the principles of contract law, with the express
terms of the Compact considered the best indication of the parties' intent."
Given the ambiguous silence concerning cross-border rights in the Red River
Compact, the Court decided that it must turn to interpretive tools in order to
determine the intent of the parties."
APPENDIX B

Map of the Red RiverCmpact Brief fr Respondent 34a.

--

Figure2: Map of the Red River Compact
Source: Brief for Respondent Appendix B, Tarrant,133 S. Ct. 2120 (No. 11889), 2013 WL 1308803.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Turan4 133 S. Ct. at 2129.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; id.
Taan4 133 S. Ct. at 2129.
Id. at 2130 (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987)).
See Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991).
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Tarrant additionally argued that if the Court adopts the OWRB's view that
the Red River Compact does not provide for cross-border diversions of state
water entitlements, the Compact did not fully allocate all of the waters of the
river system and that, to the extent that the system carried excess "unallocated"
water, the Oklahoma statutes impermissibly burdened out-of-state appropriators in acquiring that water.' This dormant Commerce Clause argument thus
turned on whether the Red River Compact, by its terms, left some water unallocated in the river system."'

The Court decided TarrantRegional Water Districtv. Herrmannin 2013,
affirming unanimously the decisions of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma ("district court") and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ("Tenth Circuit").' The district court, acknowledging that a congressionally approved interstate compact becomes a
federal statute, noted that Tarrant's Supremacy Clause claim failed where
Congress did not manifest an intent to occupy the field of water law and where
no conflict between the federal law and Oklahoma's state laws existed.' On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit, relying heavily on a presumption against preemption of state law, determined that the Compact did not preempt Oklahoma's
water laws, reasoning that the Compact expressly indicated its intent not to
displace state law and that comments to the Compact did not support preemption." After granting certiorari, the Court, in a unanimous opinion written by
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, concluded that the congressionally approved Red
River Compact did not grant Signatory States a right to cross state lines to divert water from Oklahoma.' In reaching its decision regarding the intent of the
parties, the Court relied on three interpretive tools.' After first dismissing a
presumption against preemption, the Court considered the sovereign power of
the State, the customary practice in the formation of interstate compacts, and
the conduct of the parties." Finally, the Court dismissed Tarrant's claim that
Oklahoma's water statutes violated the dormant Commerce Clause because
the Compact did not leave any water unallocated.'

60. Tarwt, 133 S. Ct. at 2136-37.
61. Id.
62. Id.at 2129.
63. Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, No. ClV-07-0045-HE, 2009 WL 3922803, at
7 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2009).
64. Tarrant Reg'I Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011); Johna Varty,
Court Report: TarrantReg'I Water Dist. v. Hermann, 656 E3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011), U.
DEN"V. WATER L. REv. (Aug. 27, 2012), http://duwaterlawreview.contarrant-regl-water-dist-vherrman/.
65. Tarn4 133 S. Ct. at 2136.
66. Id. at 2137 n.10.
67. 1d. at 2132.
68. Id. at 2136-37.
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m. THE PRESUMYTION AGAINST PREEMPTION
Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law, including congressionally approved compacts, preempts conflicting state law.' However, the Court presumes that unless Congress demonstrates a clear intent to the contrary, federal
law does not preempt state water law.' This principle, "rooted in 'respect for
the States as independent sovereigns,'" recognizes that, in fields traditionally
occupied by the states, federal acts do not supersede a state's powers unless
Congress clearly demonstrates that such was its intent. " Although the Tenth
Circuit relied heavily upon the presumption against preemption in forming its
opinion, the Court determined that there was no reason to invoke the presumption in this case."
In its amicus brief supporting Tarrant, the State of Texas ("Texas") attacked the rationale underlying the presumption against an implied preemption of state law." Texas argued that such a presumption was misplaced where
the federal law at issue, in this case the Compact, resulted from negotiations by
the Signatory States and reflected the intent of the parties to preempt any conflicting state laws." Texas argued that with Congress's approval such compacts
become federal law, preempting inconsistent state laws and other established
state-granted rights." Thus, Texas argued that it made "little sense to apply the
presumption when interpreting an interstate compact that Was negotiated,
drafted, and executed by a group of States."" Furthermore, Texas argued, such
an application favoring the contractual interpretation of one state over the objective meaning would "deprive non-breaching States of bargained-for compact
benefits under the guise of respecting State sovereignty."7
The United States also wrote an amicus brief in support of Tarrant on the
issue of preemption and agreed that a presumption against preemption is misplaced when applied to the interpretation of an interstate compact." The United States argued the rationale was not relevant to deciding whether state law
conflicts with the interstate compact because although the Congressionally
approved Compact is federal law, it is not law that is imposed by Congress
upon the Signatory States." Rather, the Signatory States create the terms of the
Compact." Therefore, the United States contended that a presumption against

69. Id.at 2137 n.8.
70. Id.at 2137 n.10.
71. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
72. Tamm4 133 S. CL at 2137 n.10.
73. Brief of the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Tamwi4 133 S.
CL 2120 (No. 11-889), 2013 WL 768640.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 3 (citing Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colbum, 310 U.S. 419, 433-34
(1940); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cheny Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1938)).
76. Id at 7.
77. Id.
78. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand at 16,
Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Herrman, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013) (No. 11-889), 2013 VL 768638.
79. Id.
80. Id.at 17.
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preemption of state law, based upon respect for the sovereign States, "sheds
little light on the Compact's interpretation.""
The Court determined that where the Signatory States themselves drafted
and agreed to the terms of the Compact, with Congress acting only to approve
the Compact, there was no reason to invoke the presumption." However, this
did not end the Court's inquiry. Before the Court could reach a conclusion
that the Compact preempted Oklahoma's state water law, it was first necessary
to determine the terms of the Compact and, second, to determine whether
Oklahoma state law was in conflict with those terms.' If the Court determined
that the Compact did not create a cross-border right to divert water, no conflict
would exist between Oklahoma's water laws and the federally approved Compact and, consequently, the Compact would not preempt Oklahoma's statutes
preventing Tarrant from diverting water from within the state."
Therefore, in an effort to construe the terms of the Compact, the Court
continued its analysis, relying on three other interpretive tools to discover the
intent of the parties with regard to a cross-border right to divert water where
the Compact was silent." The Court proceeded to consider the sovereign
power of the State, customary practice in the formation of interstate compacts,
and the conduct of the parties." The Court relied heavily upon a presumption
favoring a State's sovereign power over water resources within its boundaries
and the principle that a State does not easily cede its sovereignty in interstate
water compacts.'
IV. THREE INTERPRETIVE TOOLS TO DISAMBIGUATE SILENCE
IN INTERSTATE COMPACTS
A.SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE STATES

In determining the intent of the Signatory States with regard to a crossborder right to divert water, the Court considered the underlying principle that
a State does not easily cede its sovereignty." A State possesses an absolute right
to all the navigable waters within its territory and an essential attribute of the
State's sovereignty is the power to control public uses of that water." In United
States v. Alaska, the Supreme Court determined that "' [a] court deciding a
question of title to [the] bed of a navigable water must ... begin with a strong
presumption' against defeat of a State's title."'

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
41 U.S.
90.

Id.
Tarant; 133 S. Ct. at 2137 n.10.
Id. at 2130.
Id.
Id. at 2132.
Id.
Se id. at 2132-33.
Id. at 2132.
Id. (citing United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); Martin v. Lessee of Waddell,
367, 410 (1842)).
Id. (quoting UnitedStates v. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 5).
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Since the 1800s, Congress has delegated plenary authority to the States
over surface water resources." Initially, local rules and customs, supported by
the silent acquiescence of the federal government, regulated the right to beneficial use of water.' Then, in 1866, Congress acknowledged these local rules
and customs when it passed the Mining Act, expressly deferring to the States
the authority to determine and allocate water resources located within their
respective boundaries.' Subsequently, in 1877, Congress passed the Desert
Lands Act, stating that, "all navigable waters then a part of the public domain
became [public property], subject to the plenary control of the designated
[Sitates."' Furthermore, the Desert Lands Act bestowed upon each state the
right to determine the extent to which the rules of the riparian or prior appropriation systems would apply.' Through the Enabling Act of June 16, 1906,
which permitted Oklahoma to organize a state government and join the Union, Congress granted Oklahoma the power, on an equal footing with the original States, to control the waters located within its boundaries." Subsequently,
on November 16, 1907, Oklahoma entered the Union.'
Still, Congress went further in its delegation of authority to the States with
respect to State waters. On June 17, 1902, Congress passed the Reclamation
Act, providing that nothing in the "Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in
irrigation . . ."" In passing the Reclamation Act, Congress indicated a clear
intent to continue delegating to each State the plenary power to appropriate
and distribute the waters located within its boundaries."
Arkansas and Louisiana, as co-signatories to the Compact, shared Oklahoma's interpretation of the Compact and Oklahoma's concerns regarding the
issues and implications associated with a potential finding that the Compact
created in each party a cross-border right to divert water.'" As stated in their
joint amicus brief, a decision in favor of Tarrant would constitute a significant
infringement on the sovereignty of these states and would represent a departure from prior implementation of the Compact.'' Louisiana and Arkansas
also argued that, contrary to Tarrant's position, the Compact expressly preserved the right of each Signatory State to administer water rights in accord-

91. Okla. City Amici Brief, supra note 2, at 17 (citing California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 154 (1935)).
92. Id. (citing CaliforniaOregon Power,295 U.S. at 154).
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Desert Lands Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377).
95. Id. at 18 (citing California Oregon Power 295 U.S. at 163-64).
96. Id. at 19 (citing California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662-674 (1978)).
97. Oklhoma Statehood, November 16, 1907, NATIONAL ARcIuvEs, http://www.archives
.gov/legislative/features/oklahoina (last visited December 12, 2013).
98. Okla. City Amici Brief, supm note 2, at 20 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2012)).
99. Id.at 20 (citing 35 CONG. REC. 6675, 6679 (June 12, 1902)).
100. Louisiana and Arkansas Amici Brief, supra note 32, at 1.
101. Id.
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ance with the laws of the state and to regulate the appropriation, use, and control of water within its borders."
Additionally, Louisiana and Arkansas argued that adopting Tarrant's position that it was the intent of the Signatory States "to permit ... the unfettered
authority of one party to reach across another state's borders to appropriate
water" would require the Court to disregard the plain language of the Compact
and to give no meaning to the clear preservation of state authority over intrastate waters bargained-for in the Compact."'
Tarrant disagreed with this position and implored the Court to infer from
the silence of section 5.05(b)(1) that the Signatory States intended to dispense
with the prerogative of each to control the water within its respective boundaries." The Court sided with Oklahoma and its supporting anici and invoked a
presumption favoring the sovereign power of States over water resources within their boundaries, noting that "States rarely relinquish their sovereign powers, so when they do we would expect a clear indication of such devolution,
not inscrutable silence.""
In interpreting the ambiguous silence of the Compact, with regard to
cross-state rights to divert water, the Court was reluctant to find that the Signatory States relinquished their sovereign powers where the Compact's silence
did not indicate that such was the intent of the parties." The Court suggested
that to adopt Tarrant's position would be to assume that Oklahoma, Texas,
Louisiana, and Arkansas "silently surrendered substantial control over the
water within their borders when they agreed to the compact.""' The Court
determined that the intent to surrender such control was unlikely and that the
presumption favoring the sovereign power of the Signatory States was not
overcome by any clear indication that the parties intended to grant crossborder rights under the Compact." The Court determined a better understanding was that the parties drafted the Compact based upon the view that
States rarely relinquish their sovereign power absent a clear indication to do so
and that, therefore, the States did not intend to create rights to cross-border
diversions at the time they drafted the Compact."
B. CUSTOMARY PRACTICE
In a further attempt to determine the intent of the Signatory States with regard to a cross-border right to divert water, the Court looked to the customary
practice employed in other interstate compacts. 0o
Tarrant argued that not all interstate compacts permitting cross-border diversions contain language expressly indicating as much.' Tarrant identified the
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Upper Niobrara River Compact ("Niobrara Compact") as one such compact."'
Under the terms of the Niobrara Compact, ratified in 1962, the states of Wyoming and Nebraska agreed to an equitable apportionment of the surface waters of the upper Niobrara River basin."' Tarrant alleged the Niobrara Compact provides that "Itilhere shall be no restrictions on the use of the surface
waters of the Upper Niobrara River by Wyoming except as would be imposed
under Wyoming law" and subject to a number of express limitations on water
storage, direct flow rights, and diversions from the main stem of the river."'
The Niobrara Compact places no restrictions on the diversion of water from
within the state of Wyoming, with the exception of waters in a certain section
of the main stem of the river."'
However, rejecting Tarrant's argument, a number of amici, including cosignatories to the Compact, urged the Court to determine that silence with
respect to cross-border diversions did not customarily create a right in a Signatory State to invade the borders of its neighbor in order to divert water."' In
their joint brief, the states of Arkansas and Louisiana posited that if the Signatory States intended to allow an invasion of their borders by other parties to
the Compact, they would have stated that expressly."' In support of this argument, amici Republican River Water Conservation District, a government
entity charged with the conservation, use, and development of waters of the
Republican River in Colorado, and Rio Grande Water Conservation District,
also in Colorado, suggested that in the event that "a compact does not address
whether one state may appropriate water from within another state, the court
should apply a presumption that the parties did not intend to allow it.""' They
continued by arguing that numerous other water compacts expressly addressed
the issue of cross-border rights when the parties intended to allow it, pointing
to the Upper Colorado River, Republican River, and Rio Grande Compacts."'
The Court agreed with this position, stating that "[mlany of these other
compacts feature language that 'unambiguously permits Signatory States to
cross each other's borders to fulfill obligations under the compact."" A weakness in applying this interpretive tool here is that, although "many" compacts
incorporate such language, this non-relative term does not support a finding
that it is the customary practice in forming interstate compacts to do so. However, Tarrant cited only the Niobrara Compact as evidence of its argument to
the contrary that compacts may permit cross-border diversions without express
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language to that effect."' The Court was not convinced by the failure of a single
compact to refer to state borders that the Red River Compact also implicitly
permitted cross-border diversions." The Court determined that this evidence
did not detract from the overall custom in the formation of interstate compacts." Indeed, the Court determined that the Niobrara Compact did not actually support Tarrant's position. Given that the Niobrara Compact clearly
defines specific exceptions to the general rule that there are no restrictions on
diversions from the upper Niobrara River, the Court found that the Niobrara
Compact did not create cross-border rights through silence, but rather through
a detailed scheme." The Red River Compact's silence did not strip states of
their sovereignty because, as the Court reasoned and the cited compacts
demonstrated, creating cross-border rights of diversion would require detailed
provisions on monitoring and accounting (which the Red River Compact
lacked) to untangle the resulting "jurisdictional and administrative quagmire.""
C. CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES

Lastly, in its attempt to determine the intent of the parties with regard to a
cross-border right to divert water, the Court looked to the conduct of the parties." With interstate compacts, as with normal contracts, the Court considered a party's course of performance highly probative of its understanding of
compact terms, providing useful insight into the meaning of ambiguous provisions.
The Court held that the conduct of other Signatory States indicated it was
not the intent of the parties to provide for cross-boundary water diversion
rights." The arguments of Arkansas and Louisiana further supported Oklahoma's analysis and interpretation of the Compact as an accurate reflection of
the intent of the Signatory States with respect to cross-border water rights.'" In
their amicus brief, these parties to the Compact adopted "Oklahoma's analysis
and interpretation of the history and negotiation process of the Red River
Compact and shareId] Oklahoma's perplexity regarding the Petitioner's new
notion that cross-border water rights were created under the Compact.""
In a joint amicus brief, the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations ("Nations")
also asserted that the conduct of the parties supported Oklahoma's position.'"
The Nations argued that where the Compact language was ambiguous on the
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question of whether it allows states to "harvest" water within the borders of
another state, Tarrant's prior course of dealing is significant.'" The Nations
noted that in its prior course of dealings Tarrant sought to negotiate a water
sale contract with both the Nations and the State of Oklahoma." In late 2000,
Tarrant and several other Texas water districts and municipalities, collectively
forming the North Texas Water Alliance ("NTWA"), proposed the purchase
and diversion of approximately 320,000 to 360,000 acre-feet per year of water
from the Kiamichi River and the Little and Mountain Fork River Basins." At
the time NTWA entered into negotiations with Oklahoma and the Nations,
Tarrant did not claim an existing cross-border right to divert water from within
Oklahoma." As evidence of the understanding of the Signatory States, the
Nations claimed that these prior attempts by Tarrant to purchase water from
Oklahoma and the Nations were wholly inconsistent with Tarrant's subsequent claim that, under section 5.05(b)(1) of the Red River Compact, Texas
had a right under the Compact to cross state lines, enter into the territory of
Oklahoma, and construct facilities in order to divert water to which Texas was
entitled from Reach II, subbasin 5." The Nations asserted that these negotiations indicated that Tarrant did not believe that such a right existed under the
terms of the Compact."
Although Tarrant claimed that for certain business reasons it was compelled to negotiate for the purchase of water, the Court remained unconvinced
and agreed with the Nation's analysis." Further, the Court noted that from
1980, when Congress approved the Red River Compact, to 2007, when Tarrant filed its suit, no Signatory State pursued a cross-border diversion." The
Court found it "strange" that Tarrant would attempt to purchase water from
Oklahoma and the Nations if it believed the terms of the Compact entitled it
to make such a diversion without payment."' Thus, the Court determined that
the conduct of the parties also did not support Tarrant's position and, considering all three interpretive tools together, concluded the Red River Compact
did not silently create cross-border diversion rights for the Signatory States."'

V. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Tarrant also claimed Oklahoma's water statutes discriminated against interstate commerce for the purpose of favoring local interests."' Under the
dormant Commerce Clause, state laws may be unconstitutional if they place an
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undue burden on interstate commerce.'" Where such statutes do not regulate
intrastate and interstate activities even-handedly, the Court may strike the laws
down unless the state can show a strong public purpose for such discrimination.'" In Sporhase v. Nebraska, the Court determined that a statutory provision conditioning the grant of groundwater permits for interstate transfers on a
grant of reciprocal rights from the receiving state placed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce and violated the Commerce Clause." Therefore,
the Commerce Clause may, under certain circumstances, place limitations on
a state's power to control water within its borders."
Accordingly, Tarrant maintained that the Oklahoma statutes, by restricting
or prohibiting the out-of-state sale or transfer of water unallocated by the
Compact, impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce and violated the dormant Commerce Clause." Tarrant argued that water within subbasin 5 not already allocated to a Signatory State should be available to Tarrant
by permit."
The Court, however, determined that the Compact left no water unallocated and, thus, did not consider Tarrant's dormant Commerce Clause argument." The Compact grants each Signatory State a right to the amount of water they can put to beneficial use, though no Signatory is entitled to more than
twenty-five percent of the water in excess of Louisiana's three thousand cubic
feet per second minimum flow entitlement. The Compact calls for an accounting for entitlement purposes only in the event that one or more of the
Signatory States deems an accounting necessary." The Court determined that
water in excess of Oklahoma's twenty-five percent entitlement located within
Oklahoma was allocated to Oklahoma unless and until another State called for
an accounting and asked Oklahoma to refrain from using more than its
share." Because the Court found no water left unallocated by the Compact,
the Court held that Oklahoma's water statutes could not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause by restricting interstate commerce of that nonexistent unallocated water.'
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court ruled unanimously to uphold the decision of the Tenth Circuit,
holding that the Red River Compact did not create a cross-border right to di-
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vert water in the Signatory States." First, the Court considered the presumption against preemption of state law and determined that where the States
themselves drafted and agreed to the terms of the Compact there was no reason to invoke the presumption." However, to determine whether the Compact preempted Oklahoma state water law, the Court found it necessary to
determine the terms of the Compact."' In order to determine the intent of the
parties, the Court relied on three interpretive tools: the sovereign power of
states, the customary practice in the formation of interstate compacts, and the
conduct of the parties."
In considering the principle that States do not easily cede their sovereign
powers, the Court determined the Signatory States did not intend to cede their
sovereign powers."' Further, considering the customary practice employed by
other states in forming interstate compacts, the court determined that the
Compact did not create cross-border rights through silence." Lastly, considering the parties' conduct under the Compact, the Court concluded that the
conduct of Tarrant and the Signatory States did not support Tarrant's position
that the parties intended to create a cross-border right to divert water."'
Applying these interpretive tools, the Court determined that where the
Compact was ambiguously silent, the parties to the Red River Compact did
not intend to create a cross-border right to divert water."' Thus, no conflict
existed between the federally approved Compact and Oklahoma's state water
laws that effectively prevented out-of-state applicants from diverting water from
within the state. In the absence of a conflict, no preemption of state law existed. 16

Lastly, the Court considered Tarrant's dormant Commerce Clause argument with regard to Oklahoma's water statutes and waters of subbasin 5 that
Tarrant alleged were left unallocated. However, determining that no water was
left unallocated under the terms of the Compact, the Court did not reach the
question of whether Oklahoma's water statutes violated the dormant Commerce Clause."
The future implication of Tarrantisthat a congressionally approved compact will not preempt state water laws unless the language of the compact or
subsequent conduct of the parties clearly expresses intent by the states to surrender plenary authority over water resources within their borders. If the language of the compact is ambiguous, the Court will look to interpretive tools
with a presumption that the states have a sovereign prerogative that states must
expressly relinquish.
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Further, the Court avoided a dormant Commerce Clause decision that
may have implicated state sovereignty and states' power to control the navigable waters within their boundaries. However, the Court left open the possibility that the dormant Commerce Clause might apply in the future where statutes place an undue burden on interstate commerce with regard to unallocated
waters. The Court in Tarrantshows some indication of a more pronounced
nod to state sovereignty over water allocation within the context of compact
interpretation, but the dormant Commerce Clause still stands as a potential
counterweight to that-deference, at least with respect to "unallocated" waters
straddling state boundaries.

